RIVER OF CONTENTION: SCARCITY DISCOURSE AND WATER
COMPETITION IN HIGHLAND PERU
Barbara Lynch*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 70

II.

WATER SCARCITY AS A DRIVER OF WATER POLICY ........................ 71

III.

SCARCITY AND WATER POLITICS IN PERU........................................ 78
A. Scarcity and Water Commodification ........................................ 82
B. Peruvian Water Politics and the Production of Scarcity ........... 84

IV.

WATER COMPETITION AND SCARCITY IN THE SANTA
WATERSHED...................................................................................... 85

V.

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................... 92

*
Visiting Associate Professor, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, School of City
and Regional Planning, Georgia Institute of Technology.

69

70

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 42:69

I. INTRODUCTION
The policy prescriptions of international institutions seeking to transform
fresh water governance in Latin America are driven by fear of an impending
crisis due to an absolute scarcity of fresh water. The assumption that scarcity
is the fundamental problem for the governance of fresh water resources leads
to adoption of three main types of policy solutions. One is to build a new
institutional architecture to support integrated water resource management
(IWRM) at the national and river basin levels. The second is to emphasize
new infrastructure to capture free flowing water, the transfer from regions of
abundance to regions of deficit, and new technologies that make water
delivery more efficient (e.g., drip irrigation). The third solution is to treat
water as an economic good by pricing it, creating transferable rights in water,
and supporting the development of water markets.
These policy prescriptions, coupled with World Bank and InterAmerican
Development bank loans, have driven recent water reforms in Peru, a country
where water conflicts have been numerous and often severe, posing difficult
if not insuperable challenges for water governance. Is water scarcity the
reason for these conflicts, or are other factors equally if not more important?
And, are policies shaped by a fear of impending scarcity part of the solution
or part of the problem?
Glacial retreat due to climate change has led to predictions of water
scarcity, and Peru is no exception. This perception of impending scarcity is
acute in Peru’s Río Santa watershed, which extends from the snowcapped
peaks of the Cordillera Blanca down to arid coastal lands in the regions of
Ancash and La Libertad. Fed by meltwaters from the world’s largest tropical
glaciated land mass, the Santa watershed has become an international poster
child for climate change.1 There is some debate among hydrologists as to
whether and when river flows will diminish, but competition for the Santa’s
waters is already severe.2 However, it is not clear from my analysis of water
conflicts in the valley or from meetings and interviews with irrigators,

1
See DAENE C. MCKINNEY & ALTON BYERS, U.S. AGENCY INT’L DEV., ADAPTATION TO
CLIMATE CHANGE: CASE STUDY—GLACIAL RETREAT AND ADAPTATION OPTIONS IN PERU’S RIO
SANTA BASIN, available at http://www.caee.utexas.edu/prof/mckinney/Peru/Peru%20Case%20S
tudy%20Jul2011_v6_Draft_Final.pdf (exploring the specific characteristics and vulnerabilities of
the Rio Santa Basin).
2
See, e.g., Barbara D. Lynch, Vulnerabilities, Competition and Rights in a Context of
Climate Change: Toward Equitable Water Governance in Peru’s Rio Santa Valley, 22
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 364, 364 (2012).
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fishers, local officials, and water managers that water competition is an
artifact of scarcity. Nor is it clear whether the water shortfalls experienced in
the watershed are due to demography, climate change, or rising demand. It
is clear, however, that understanding water competition and conflict in terms
of scarcity will have implications for technological and economic approaches
to water management and, more broadly, for institutional approaches to
water governance. These approaches will have outcomes that may or may
not be equitable.
What are the implications for water management and water governance
when water competition is understood in terms of scarcity? To address these
questions, I first review several different positions on water scarcity and their
policy implications. I then ask how these are reflected in the Peruvian water
regime that has taken shape in the past decade. Then, I look at water
competition and conflict in the Río Santa Valley and ask whether and how
they relate to scarcity and scarcity discourse. I conclude by suggesting
alternative approaches that might lead to more equitable or inclusive water
governance and do more to prevent the water crisis predicted by international
experts.
II. WATER SCARCITY AS A DRIVER OF WATER POLICY
The idea of scarcity underlies much of the contemporary writing about
water governance, writing that comes from a transnational network or
epistemic community of water experts and, in many cases, proponents of
IWRM.3 In 1992, members of this network crafted the Dublin Statement on
Water and Sustainable Development, a set of very general policy guidelines
prepared for the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development. The statement opens with the following paragraph:
Scarcity and misuse of fresh water pose a serious and growing
threat to sustainable development and protection of the
environment. Human health and welfare, food security,
industrial development and the ecosystems on which they
depend, are all at risk, unless water and land resources are

3
KEN CONCA, GOVERNING WATER: CONTENTIOUS TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS AND GLOBAL
INSTITUTION BUILDING (2006).
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managed more effectively in the present decade and beyond
than they have been in the past.4
Similarly, the World Bank’s 2008 World Development Report argues that
agriculture is “by far the largest user of water, contributing to water
scarcity.”5 The challenge, it states, is “to use less water in the face of
growing water scarcities.”6 The World Bank opens its discussion of issues in
a document entitled “Sustaining Water” by stating, “Water is a scarce
resource that has a multitude of interdependent uses (irrigation, drinking
water, sanitation, energy and environmental services).”7 A 2007 Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) bulletin warns, “By 2025, 1,800 million
people will be living in countries or regions with absolute water scarcity, and
two-thirds of the world population could be under stress conditions.”8
Not all members of the fresh water epistemic community are equally
convinced that the world is running out of water. The 2006 Human
Development Report talks about a global water crisis but casts it in terms of
water insecurity or deprivation of access to water.9 “The scarcity at the heart
of the global water crisis,” it argues, “is rooted in power, poverty and
inequality, not in physical availability,” and it identifies the underlying cause
of scarcity as institutional and political rather than physical.10 Since 2010,
preoccupation with risk and uncertainty has displaced scarcity discourse to
some extent, and the term water stress is used with increasing frequency.11
That said, the idea of scarcity continues to inform water governance debates.

4

Int’l Conference on Water & the Environment, Jan. 26–31, 1992, The Dublin Statement
on Water and Sustainable Development U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/112 (Mar. 12, 1992),
available at http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/hwrp/documents/english/icwedece.html.
5
WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008: AGRICULTURE FOR DEVELOPMENT 4
(2008), available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5990.
6
Id. at 182.
7
WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK GROUP IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS REPORT OF THE WATER
RESOURCES SECTOR STRATEGY, SUSTAINING WATER FOR ALL IN A CHANGING CLIMATE 4
(2010), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/sustainingwater.pdf.
8
WaterLex, Special Issue: Water Cooperation and Human Rights (Mar. 2013), available at
http://www.waterlex.org/resources/documents/WWD%202013%20WaterLex%20 messages.pdf.
9
U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEV. REPORTS, BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY
AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS 3–6 (2006), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/huma
n-development-report-2006.pdf [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORTS 2006].
10
Id. at 2.
11
See Len Abrams, Water Scarcity, THE WATER PAGE (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.africanwate
r.org/drought_water_scarcity.htm (explaining the different terms in international discourse).
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Water scarcity is attributed to population growth, economic development,
growing demand for food and other agricultural products, and urbanization
on the one hand and inefficient, wasteful, and profligate use on the other. It
is widely thought that climate change will bring scarcity to an unprecedented
level, creating new problems whose solutions are not to be found in
traditional water management repertoires. Glacial retreat in the Andean
“water towers” is emblematic of this issue. The 2010 World Development
Report on Development and Climate Change states that changes in water
availability “may be so rapid and unpredictable that traditional agricultural
and water management practices may no longer be useful. . . . This is
already the case for the indigenous communities in the Cordillera Blanca in
Peru, where farmers are facing such rapid changes that their traditional
practices are failing.”12 Thus, the report deploys the specter of climateinduced scarcity to delegitimate the local knowledge, institutions and
practices of campesino communities13 and small farmers to justify the
transfer of water management authority to state agencies.
Viewing the problem of freshwater access in terms of absolute, physical
scarcity has policy implications. One set of policy prescriptions, emanating
from a belief in scarcity emphasizes institutional change. “Meeting the water
scarcity, challenge,” according to the World Bank, “will require integrated
management of water use at river-basin levels for better water allocation
across sectors, and greater efficiency in the use of water within irrigation
systems.”14 It goes on to argue that decentralized governance models are
more likely to be successful than those reliant on centralized bureaucracies.15
The question is whether water governance policies designed to manage
water more efficiently produce inequities in water allocation and distribution
that deprive some groups of access to the water essential for their lives and
livelihoods. On this point, Swyngedouw argues that “particular social
groups lack access to water not because of real or alleged water scarcities,
but because of differential entitlements associated with differential power
12

WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010, supra note 7, at 137.
Campesino communities, recognized by the state, are rural jurisdictions that may lie
within or be coterminous with municipalities. These rural settlements—descendents of the
indigenous communities recognized in the early twentieth century—are characterized by
collective land and water tenure and an elected president and directors, and a degree of
autonomy from the municipalities and districts in which they are located. See INT’L LAND
COAL., Campesinos Communities and Land Use, http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/
files/legacy/legacypdf/angoc/ch6/ch6p06.pdf?q=pdf/angoc/ch6/ch6p06.pdf.
14
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008, supra note 7, at 184.
15
Id. at 185.
13
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relations.”16 He goes on to say that scarcity may be produced when fear of a
“hydro-socio-ecological disaster” is used to justify investment in big water
projects and water commodification.17
The 2006 UNDP Human
Development Report puts it even more bluntly: “scarcity,” according to the
report, is “manufactured through political processes and institutions that
disadvantage the poor.”18 Thus, when coupled with policies that favor water
consuming industries and the construction of large public works for water
storage and transfer, political institutions and processes that under-represent
the interests of poor and highly vulnerable water users can produce scarcity.
Infrastructural approaches to addressing scarcity have also received
considerable attention. This is not surprising given the abundance of engineers
in the epistemic community that has grown up around freshwater management
and governance. Addressing the problem of glacial retreat in the Andes and
the Himalayas, the World Bank suggested additional investments in water
storage, irrigation planning and system design.19 Criticized in the 1990s for its
initial investment in the Chixoy, Narmada, and other ill-conceived dam and
hydroelectric projects, the Bank moved away from lending for big
infrastructure projects.20 But by 2003, it had returned to its earlier eagerness to
fund big dam and water transfer project developments.21
The European Declaration for a New Water Culture has criticized this
emphasis on what it calls “supply-side strategies.”22 These strategies, which
had become the normal mode of state intervention in water management by
the mid-twentieth century, emphasized the construction of massive public

16

ERIK SWYNGEDOUW, U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEV. REPORT, Power, Water, and
Money: Exploring the Nexus 63 (Feb. 2006) (Erik Swyngedouw), available at http://hdr.undp.
org/en/reports/global/hdr2006/papers/swyngedouw.pdf.
17
Id. at 52.
18
WORLD DEV. REPORT, supra note 9, at 11.
19
2011 O.J. (L 2010/2270INI) 5–7, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/Lex
UriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:056E:0067:0074:EN:PDF.
20
See generally International Rivers Network, The World Bank’s Big Dam Legacy
(October 2007), available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attachedfiles/the_world_
banks_big_dam_legacy.pdf (exploring previous projects and making recommendations).
21
Id.
22
Foundation for a New Water Culture, Madrid, Feb. 18, 2005, European Declaration for a
New Water Culture, available at http://www.isiim.agropolis.org/OSIRIS/doc/EuropeNWC_dr
ed.pdf.
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works for water storage, transfer, and hydropower generation.23 The
Declaration sees these projects, which are justified as scarcity-preventing, as
scarcity producing.24 “Problems of scarcity,” it states, “are usually caused by
abusive and unsustainable water use resulting from large-scale projects for
economic development, rather than basic use by a population.”25 The
supply-side approach, with its emphasis on infrastructure, has a powerful
constituency—one that includes staff of international lending institutions,
transnational engineering firms, and irrigation engineers working in
government bureaucracies.26 At the end of the day, the emphasis on
megaproject construction has helped to stimulate expansion of the very
demands it was intended to satisfy. Moreover, these megaprojects, despite
much of the rhetoric that has surrounded them, turn out to be less about water
conservation than about water redistribution and, as a corollary, the
redistribution of water stress.
In the course of over-stimulating demand, governments may also adopt
policies that make access to water less equitable. The European Water
Declaration argues that the redistribution of scarcities associated with
supply-side strategies exacerbate inequities “owing to the weakness of
democratic systems in promoting social participation in the design,
implementation and monitoring of [water] policies.”27
The third, and perhaps dominant, approach to the problem of scarcity is
economic. Conca points out that the idea that treating water as a scarce
economic resource will lead to its conservation is central to the IWRM
paradigm.28 This assumption underlies the guidelines or principles produced
by the 1992 Dublin Water Conference, a meeting of international water
experts in preparation for the 1992 UN Environment and Development
Conference in Rio de Janeiro.29 The fourth and most widely accepted of the
Dublin principles defines water as an economic good and links scarcity to the

23

See, e.g., SANJEEV KHAGRAM, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: TRANSNATIONAL STRUGGLES
FOR WATER AND POWER (2004); PATRICK MCCULLY, SILENCED RIVERS: THE ECOLOGY AND
POLITICS OF LARGE DAMS (2001).
24

International Rivers Network, supra note 20, at 1–2.
European Declaration for a New Water Culture, supra note 22.
26
For example, Ministries of Energy, Natural Resources, and Economy and Finance.
27
European Declaration for a New Water Culture, supra note 22, at 8.
28
CONCA, supra note 3.
29
International Conference on Water and the Environment, The Dublin Statement on Water
and Sustainable Development (Jan. 31, 1992), available at http://www.undocuments.net/h 2odub.htm.
25
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failure to recognize its economic value.30 In so doing, as Conca observes, the
statement steered water governance discourse away from an emphasis on
water as a basic human right.31 This shift was consonant with the general
neoliberal trend in global trade and development policy.
In the wake of the Cochabamba water war of 2000, rights discourse has
reemerged in international water discussions, culminating in the adoption of
the July 2010 UN General Assembly resolution recognizing access to clean
water and sanitation as a human right.32 Nonetheless, UNESCO’s fourth
World Water Development Report states that “a sense of the economic value
of water in its different states and uses is a necessary part of water
management.”33 The report goes on to suggest that in well-functioning water
markets, prices can reflect the value of water necessary to secure the most
valuable water uses.34 The report backs away from a market fundamentalist
position, calling instead for regulation by public institutions.35
Economic prescriptions deriving from an emphasis on scarcity range from
elimination of subsidies for profligate water use to water pricing and the
development of water markets.36 Water markets are seen as contributing to
the efficient allocation of water among diverse users. Liberalization of trade
policies, the Bank argues, would lead to greater efficiency by encouraging
the import of water-intensive commodities to water-scarce nations, which
would in turn specialize in less thirsty crops with higher market value.37 In a
study for the World Bank, De la Torre, Fajnzylber, and Nash argue that
water marketization would facilitate inter-basin water transfers to alleviate
regional scarcity and dam building and hydropower development would
reduce the impacts of variation in yearly river flow.38 Lastly, the 2010
30

Id.
See CONCA, supra note 3.
32
G.A. Res. 64/292 ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010), available at http://www.
un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/292.
33
U.N. EDUC., SCIENTIFIC, & CULTURAL ORG., THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 4: MANAGING WATER UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND RISK 284 (2012),
available at http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SC/pdf/WWDR4%20
Volume%201-Managing%20Water%20under%20Uncertainty%20and%20Risk.pdf.
34
Id. at 220.
35
Id. at 272.
36
See generally WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2008, supra note 5.
37
Id.
38
See generally The World Bank, The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Redevelopment, Low Carbon, High Growth: Latin American Responses to Climate Change
(2009) (Augusto de la Torre, Pablo Fajnzylber, John Nash), available at http://www.preventi
onweb.net/files/7574_bm10121.pdf.
31
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World Development Report calls for transferrable water rights, full-value
pricing, and well-regulated markets coupled with strong institutions and
expert information.39
The emphasis on scarcity in international policy circles raises several
questions. First, what is scarcity? Second, is scarcity an appropriate point of
departure for conversations about water governance and allocation? Third,
what problems does an emphasis on scarcity occlude, and what problems
might it exacerbate? Fourth, are the institutional, infrastructural, and
economic policies proposed to combat scarcity likely to improve or restrict
access to water, particularly for populations and ecosystems that are highly
vulnerable in the face of natural and economic disasters.
Swyngedouw in an exhaustive, if provocative, background paper for
UNDP devotes considerable attention to the negative effects of scarcity
discourse on water equity and asks us to differentiate between scarcity and
restricted access to water.40 His basic argument is that the water scarcity
experienced by particular groups in society is relative and has little
relationship to its absolute availability; rather, it is socially produced.41 Lack
of access to water occurs “not because of real or alleged water scarcities, but
because of differential entitlements associated with differential power
relationships.”42 This position is shared by scholars from the Stockholm
Water Institute, who talk about “scarcities” rather than “scarcity” and define
these as “socially and politically induced challenges.”43
Reference to scarcity as the cause of water stress has political,
ideological, and economic implications.
On the economic side,
Swyngedouw concludes that scarcity discourse serves as a justification for
supply-side investment—construction of infrastructure for water capture and
for its transfer from places where it is perceived to be abundant to those
where it is apparently scarce—and for water commodification, if not
privatization.44 But the function of scarcity in the marketization of water
goes further. Scarcity, for Swyngedouw, is what makes the market work.
Therefore, making a market-based strategy for water governance work may
39

WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010, supra note 5, at 49–58.
See generally SWYNGEDOUW, supra note 16.
41
Id. at 7.
42
Id. at 63.
43
Hakan Tropp, Malin Falkenmark & Jan Lundqvist, SIWI (Stockholm Int’l Water Inst.),
Water Governance Challenges: Managing Competition and Scarcity for Hunger and Poverty
Reduction and Environmental Sustainability, in 13 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT OFFICE
OCCASIONAL PAPER 3 (2006).
44
Power, Water, and Money, supra note 16, at 49, 64.
40
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require the social production or engineering of scarcity. Proponents of water
markets may find it helpful in such cases to attribute the resulting
maldistribution of water to naturally or demographically produced scarcity.
In this context, environmentalists who define water resource problems in
terms of water scarcity may unwittingly find themselves in the position of
creating the very shortfalls they seek to prevent.
Alternative framings of fresh-water issues may do more in the long run to
encourage water conservation and to achieve more equitable allocation.
Greater attention to how water uses can be complementary rather than
competitive, for example, may encourage the development of strategies for
equitable allocation across sectoral lines. An emphasis on complementarity
can also create opportunities for conservation and water reuse. For example,
in northern Peru I found complementarites between use for milling, cloth
processing, micro hydro, and irrigation as well as between upstream and
downstream agricultural uses.45 At the river basin level, a water regime
based on complementarity would oblige upstream water users to maintain the
capacity of the landscape to store water and to use it in ways that permit
urban and agricultural reuse at lower elevations. The burden of behavioral
change would fall on major polluters. In sum, however, but an emphasis on
maintenance of a usable water supply and sharing during shortfalls may
reduce vulnerability.
Similarly, emphasis on water stress, rather than scarcity, would draw
attention to the needs of groups whose lives and livelihoods are particularly
vulnerable to changes in water quality as well as availability. Lastly, a focus
on access, although it may lead to the supply-side solutions that create new
demands, draws our attention to the distribution of water across ethnic,
national, and socioeconomic lines.
III. SCARCITY AND WATER POLITICS IN PERU46
Water scarcity is a problematic concept in Peru, yet it underlies major
changes in the nation’s water regime, changes which include its 2009 water
law which authorized the establishment of a centralized agency for water
45
See Barbara Deutsch Lynch, The Bureaucratic Transition: Peruvian Government
Intervention in Sierra Small-Scale Irrigation (1988) (dissertation, Cornell University).
46
Unless otherwise noted, data for this section is drawn from unstructured, open-ended
interviews conducted by the author in Lima and Huaraz with officials of the Autoridad
Nacional del Agua (ANA), the Ministry of the Environment (MINAM), the Defensoria del
Pueblo in May–June 2011, and September–October 2012.
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policy administration and the creation of new watershed-level institutions
comprised of private and government representatives.47 Peru has the third
largest volume of fresh water per capita in South America, but within the
country, water is unequally distributed. The country is comprised of three
distinct regions: the well-watered but sparsely populated selva with 13% of the
nation’s population of approximately thirty million inhabitants; the drier sierra,
watered by mountain streams and glacial meltwaters, home to 32% of the
population; and the arid coast, which is home to 54% of Peru’s population, the
bulk of its industrial activity, and 77% of its irrigated land, much of which is
devoted export agriculture.48 Approximately 98% of the nation’s water supply
flows into the Amazon drainage, which contains 26% of the nation’s
population. The coast, in contrast, with less than 2% of the nation’s water,
finds itself almost totally dependent on water coming out of the Andes.49
This imbalance between population and industrial activity concentration
on the one hand and water availability on the other is the product of
agricultural and industrial policies enacted over the past century, but it is
often viewed in terms of scarcity. This emphasis on scarcity is reflected in
massive government support for coastal irrigation and for the transfer of
“excess” real water from the Amazon basin and the highlands—where it is
integral to the maintenance of natural and agroecosystems and to domestic
food security—to the coast where export agriculture predominates.50 One
national water authority official interviewed in 2012 suggested that the
concept of the watershed be enlarged to include places of water deficit and
places of water abundance in order to encourage equitable sharing of the
resource through its transfer from water-abundant to water-scarce regions.51
Not all water transfers involve real water. Over the past decade,
economists have taken an increasing interest in transfers of what is termed
47
Reglamento de la Ley de Recursos Hídricos, Ley No. 29338 (2009) (Peru), available at
http://www.ana.gob.pe/media/533045/reglamento%20lrh%20-%20n%C2%BA%2029338.pdf.
48
INEI (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas e Informatica), Annuario de Estadisticas
Ambientales 23 (2011), available at http://www.inei.gob.pe/BiblioINEIPub/BancoPub/Est/Lib
0978/Libro.pdf; Julio F. Alegria, The Challenges of Water Resource Management in Peru 6
(2007), available at http://www.uwgb.edu/envsustain/Full_paper%20Challenges%20Water%
20Resources%20_JF%20Alegria_.pdf.
49
J. Painter, UNDP, Deglaciation in the Andean Region, in 55 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT OFFICE OCCASIONAL PAPER (2007).
50
See Juana Vera Delgado & Linden Vincent, Community Irrigation Supplies and Regional
Water Transfers in the Colca Valley, Peru (International Mountain Society 2013), available at
http://www.bioone.org/doi/pdf/10.1659/MRD-JOURNAL-D-12-00119.1.
51
Interviews with National Water Authority engineers (names withheld), in Lima, Peru,
(Sept. 21, 2012).
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virtual water—or water in the form of agricultural products.52 Peru has more
fresh water per capita than any other South American country.53 In a context
of perceived world scarcity, the country becomes an attractive candidate for
virtual water exports in the form of water-intensive crops even though water
stress is often severe in the areas where export production takes place—areas
where population and economic activities are also concentrated. At present,
Peru is exporting virtual water in the form of vegetables, table grapes, rice,
animal feed, and biofuels. Transfers of virtual water can have perverse
outcomes, as in cases where water is transferred from water-scarce to waterabundant localities. In the Ica Valley, for example, asparagus production is
creating water scarcity as it depletes local aquifers. It is beginning to compete
for water not only with small farmers and urban consumers in the lower Ica
Valley, but with cultivators and livestock producers in the upstream region of
Huancavelica.54 At a global level, very little of this produce is destined for
arid countries; over half of Peru’s production finds its way to the United States,
and most of the rest goes to Western Europe.55 The tradeoffs required for
continuing emphasis on export agriculture are implied, but unstated in
UNESCO’s WWDR4 conclusion that “[g]iven the intention of a number of
countries in the region to play a major role in satisfying increased global
demands for food and biofuels, irrigation will need to become more water52
See, e.g., UNESCO, Managing Water Under Uncertainty and Risk, in 4 UNITED NATIONS
WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT 10 (2012).
53
D. Olson, Recuros Hídricos, in PERU: LA OPORTUNIDAD DE UN PAIS DIFERENTE:
PROSPERO, EQUITATIVO Y GOBERNABLE (M. Giugale et al. eds., 2006).
54
Gerardo Damonte, Dinamicas de Concentracion y Escasez de Agua: El Boom AgroExportador y Los Pequenos Propietarios en la Cuenca Media y Alta del Rio Ica (2012); M.T.
ORE ET AL., INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS PERUANOS, EL AGUA ANTE NUEVOS DESAFIOS: ACTORES E
INICIATIVAS EN ECUADOR, PERU Y BOLIVIA (2009); Urteaga 2012; A.K. Chapagain & A.Y.
Hoekstra, The Global Component of Freshwater Demand and Supply: An Assessment of
Virtual Water Flows Between Nations As a Result of Trade in Agricultural and Industrial
Products, in 33 WATER INTERNATIONAL 19–32 (2008); N. HEPWORTH, J.C. POSTIGO, B.G.
DELGADO & P. KJELL, DROP BY DROP: UNDERSTANDING THE U.K.’S WATER FOOTPRINT
THROUGH A CASE STUDY OF PERUVIAN ASPARAGUS (2010).
55
Peruvian Asparagus Exports Grow 13% Annually, ANDINA AGENCIA PERUANA DE
NOTICIAS (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.andina.com.pe/english/noticia-peruvian-asparagus-exp
orts-grow-13-annually-471281.aspx. According to the website of Peru’s Ministry of
Agriculture (MINAG), “Los principales países de destino de las exportaciones del espárrago
fresco fueron principalmente EE.UU. con 69% del total de las exportaciones en el año 2006,
seguido de los Países Bajos con 10%, Inglaterra con 9% y España con 8%.” Comercio
Mundial, PERU MINISTERIO DE AGRICULTURA Y RIEGO 3 (2013), http://www.minag.gob.pe/por
tal/sector-agrario/agricola/cultivos-de-importancia-nacional/esp%C3%A1rragos/comercio-mu
ndial21?start=2.
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efficient.”56 The implication is that all irrigators, whether or not they are
engaged in the export of virtual water, will have to share the burden of
installing expensive new irrigation equipment on their lands. Revenues
returned to the state from virtual water exports may be used to produce
valuable social goods, but within stressed watersheds—including the Río Santa
valley—ecosystem health and the livelihoods of the poorest and most
vulnerable water users, already endangered, would be further impaired.
Water scarcity discourse has also stimulated investment in farmland as a
vehicle for virtual water exports. In Peru, considerable resources have been
devoted to what is termed expansion of the agricultural frontier. In practice
this has meant construction of large-scale irrigation works to bring water to
arid lands, which are then sold to large foreign and domestic agroexport
investors through public auctions.57 Smaller and Mann conclude that “what
are often described now as land grabs [foreign investments in farmland in
Africa and the Americas] are really water grabs: the purchase or long-term
lease of land in order to obtain the water rights that come with the land under
domestic law or with the investment contract itself.”58 The authors go on to
state that these investments shift water to “essentially long-distance farming”
at the risk of displacing local food producers and taking away their water
rights and that these transfers are more likely where free trade agreements
are in place.59 In other words, at a global level, scarcity concerns are
stimulating foreign investment in land for the capture of virtual water. In
Peru, these investments are occurring in conjunction with the expansion of
large-scale irrigation, aquifer mining and land concentration.60
Big coastal irrigation systems existed in Peru’s coastal region in
prehistory, but they were built with increasing frequency in the early
twentieth century.61 Beginning in the 1970s, large-scale water transfer and
irrigation projects were undertaken with the purpose of opening new lands on
56
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lands.pdf (alteration in original).
59
Id. at 7–11.
60
Burneo, supra note 57, at 11–33; Damonte supra note 54.
61
Burneo, supra note 57, at 11–33.

82

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 42:69

the coast.62 As noted above, increasingly the objective of these massive
projects is to improve state lands for sale to investors, effectively augmenting
water demand.
One ongoing effort is the Olmos-Transandino project. Still under
construction, the ecologically and socially problematic Olmos project
includes a recently completed nineteen kilometer long tunnel that diverts
water from the Huancabamba River, an eastward flowing Amazon tributary
to the Pacific drainage on the North coast.63 By the 1990s, state-funded
projects were undertaken with a new objective: improvement of state lands
for sale to investors and export-oriented agroenterprises. The Olmos
Transfer project, for example, called for expropriation of 110,000 hectares of
irrigable land belonging to campesino communities for sale to agribusiness
producers.64 So, infrastructure improvement in Peru, justified by the threat
of scarcity, has helped to fuel an agroexport boom and a corollary transfer of
virtual water to the water-abundant United States and Western Europe. As a
result, demand for water has expanded enormously. Where subterranean
waters are exploited, as in Ica and Lambayeque, water scarcity is indeed
being produced.
A. Scarcity and Water Commodification
The definition of water as an economic good, enshrined in the Dublin
Principles, is based on the premise that market mechanisms would result in
its more efficient use and allocation among uses.65 One way of treating
water as an economic good is pricing it in a way that ensures conservation.
But unless the price of water is calibrated with the ability to pay, pricing
simply shifts water to its most profitable rather than its most essential uses.
At this point, the Peruvian government has not enacted national water pricing
policies, although this is occurring in some municipalities.
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Water rights can be allocated in a number of ways. The Peruvian water
law declares water to be the property of the state.66 The law recognizes the
preexisting water rights of indigenous and campesino communities, although
this recognition can be construed quite narrowly, and the rights are not
antecedent to, but rather granted by the national water authority.67 Moreover,
the government may use its authority to distribute water according to what it
deems to be the highest and best use, overriding other legal commitments.68
In Andean communities, rights to surface water are typically tied to land
and to contributions to irrigation system maintenance.69 Some economists
favor full commodification of water through the creation of simple,
transferrable water rights.70 Where water is treated as alienable property, this
would in principle facilitate its flow from places of abundance to places of
scarcity, enhancing spatial equity. But, in Peru, full commodification of water
would manufacture scarcity in two ways. Just as real estate markets exclude
the poor from housing while creating new demands for real property, market
pricing of water and water rights would restrict or even exclude poorer
cultivators and urban water users from access to a safe and reliable water
supply as it increases demand. This would result in differential access.71
Second, commodification creates scarcities when it facilitates the transfer
of water to places and uses where its application would be most profitable.
The Olmos Project is an example, but Stensrud and Andersen also make this
point in a study of irrigation in the Colca Valley following construction of
the massive Majes project, which transferred water from campesino
communities to agribusiness enterprises on the coast.72 So, we have here a
Catch-22. Where fear of scarcity fosters implementation of market-based
approaches to water allocation, water stress and apparent scarcity is produced
as water is shifted from life-sustaining to profit-generating uses.
66
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B. Peruvian Water Politics and the Production of Scarcity
While the treatment of water as an economic good is a major driver of
scarcity, shortfalls may be created even where full marketization is absent.
Scarcity can be politically produced where states seek to encourage or simply
ignore activities that are highly water consumptive. At a national or
watershed level, the result is expansion of demand. To meet new water
demands, states may encourage aquifer mining and large water transfer
projects that produce scarcity.
This is indeed happening in Peru where water marketization has yet to
occur. The nation’s 1969 water law abolished private ownership of water
making it property of the state.73 “Administrative control resided [and still
does] with the Ministry of Agriculture, which supervised a nested hierarchy of
water user associations.”74 In highland communities, associations established
by law operated side by side with autonomous local irrigator organizations.75
Communities accepting state aid for irrigation improvements were expected to
bring local water institutions into conformity with the water code. The 1969
water law called for more efficient water allocation and creation of new rights,
but allowed for adjustments to changing patterns of demand, particularly
during periods of drought.76 The law should have made water allocation more
equitable and reduced vulnerability to drought, but enforcement was erratic
and private interests often prevailed.77
In the 1990s, the government of President Alberto Fujimori drafted
legislation that would have privatized water and created tradable water
rights, but irrigators vociferously opposed the changes and the bill was
scrapped when Fujimori left office in 2000 in the face of mounting
scandals.78 Subsequent governments have recognized water as belonging to
the nation.79 This retreat from a strong neoliberal position is reflected in the
2009 water law which also recognizes the rights of indigenous and
73
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campesino communities to manage water according to their uses and
customs (usos y costumbres).80 Like the 1969 law, it can, as many irrigators
fear, be used to justify water privatization, but to date, outright privatization
of water and creation of water markets has not happened.81 Simplification of
water rights is a more likely outcome. If the emergent regime creates a
unified legal framework encompassing all water uses, it would, as Boelens
argues, reduce the array of possible water sharing arrangements that could be
implemented under changing climatic conditions and undermine the ability
of water user groups to collectively manage water.82
In sum, much of what looks like scarcity in Peru is simply inequitable or
constrained access to relatively clean water resulting from policies that have
(1) encouraged expansion of demand, particularly in arid areas, (2) turned a
blind eye to water contamination by mining and manufacturing activity, (3)
encouraged aquifer mining and the transfer of water from the highlands to
the arid coast, and (4) created institutional forms that systematically underrepresent the most vulnerable urban and rural water users. In addition,
intraregional and interregional inequities are responsible for the production
of scarcities in highland Peru, deepening the vulnerability of poor rural
communities to climate-related stress.
Government policies have stimulated expansion of demand by fostering
the growth of the nation’s mining, export agriculture, and energy sectors.
These constraints are produced by an inequitable distribution of political
power and a lack of sectoral or jurisdictional representation rather than water
scarcity per se. With climate change and the absence of equitable water
governance, water pollution and diversion are giving rise to water conflicts
and exacerbating the vulnerability of neighborhoods, communities, and
ecosystems.
IV. WATER COMPETITION AND SCARCITY IN THE SANTA WATERSHED83
The Río Santa watershed, as noted above, has become something of a
poster child for climate-induced water scarcity. Indeed, water stress in the
valley is intensifying, and numerous water conflicts have erupted over the
80
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past decade.84 International capital, working in tandem with national
enterprises and the Peruvian state, has been a major contributor to water
stress in the Río Santa watershed. Enterprises in the mining, energy, and
export-agriculture sectors have claimed water rights, tacitly and quasi-legally
in the case of the mining industry (which sees itself, and is seen by the state,
as a minor water user despite its serious impacts on water quality) and the
hydropower industry. Agribusiness enterprises in the large coastal irrigated
areas have received formal water rights together with irrigable land. These
favored industries compete for water and land with domestic food and
livestock production, mountaineering and ecotourism, a growing aquaculture
industry, and urban water systems. Water contamination by mine wastes,
untreated sewage, and agrichemicals constitutes a serious threat to public
health and to the integrity and sustainability of natural and agroecosystems.
Water conflicts have proliferated as a result of these activities. Some of
these conflicts pit jurisdictions against one another; others involve
competition for water among economic sectors and subsectors. While most
sectoral conflicts have an upstream-downstream dimension, this is not
always true of jurisdictional competition among communities, municipalities,
or regions. Environmental justice respect for existing community and
municipal water rights lie at the core of many conflicts.
Conflict has taken different forms at different points in the watershed. In
the high Andes (above 3,300 meters), water disputes are often mine-related.85
The mining sector mushroomed in the 1990s.86 In 2010, minerals accounted
for 61% of export earnings.87 Transnational enterprises pay royalties to the
government, some of which returns to regional and local governments where
Mine royalties are narrowly targeted, while
the mines operate.88
84
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environmental impacts of mining are diffuse. As transnational mining
operations proliferated, so did small marginal enterprises lacking pollution
controls. Extraction and road building bring arsenic and heavy metals to the
surface and into the Santa, and leaching from old mine tailings continues
unabated. Both are polluting the Santa and making some of its tributaries too
toxic for irrigation or domestic use. Road building and the movement of
heavy equipment through the spongy terrain of the high meadows (puna) is
reducing the water storage capability of the land and may well contribute to
absolute scarcity down the road. Mining is also blamed for stream
acidification and reduction of vegetative cover in Huascarán National Park, a
reserve encompassing much of the Cordillera Blanca and surrounding puna
lands.89 In addition, ores are often washed with water to separate useful ore
from tailings, but Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) officials charged
with monitoring pollution are reluctant to impose sanctions that could affect
the financial performance of the sector.90
In December 2010, a decision by MEM to grant a permit for mineral
exploration on the shores of Lake Conococha, the Santa’s headwaters, led to
a massive protest by livestock-producing and farming communities, urban
water users, and defenders of the Huascarán National Park.91 Protesters
blocked the highway from Lima to Huaraz and marched in the streets of the
region’s cities calling for cancellation of the license to pollute. The conflict
abated only when the government suspended the exploration permit.92 In
January 2011, responding to coalition demands, the national water authority
declared that mining exploration and other industrial activities would not
proceed in the wetland near the lake shore.93
89
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The 2010 conflict was about many things, but it was not about water
scarcity. In the first instance, it was about competing and incompatible uses
of land and water—mining versus agriculture and domestic use. It also had
to do with ecosystem protection within a national park and the right of a
campesino community to control land and water use within its boundaries.
A somewhat similar, less widespread, but far more protracted conflict took
place in the Callejón de Huaylas, or the middle river basin. This part of the
watershed is home to Andean farming systems, commercial agriculture, smallscale mining, and numerous small urban settlements. Despite urbanization,
outmigration, and land abandonment, the Callejón remains a reservoir of
agrobiodiversity; its cultivators make a substantial contribution to regional
food security.94 Deterioration of potable water and small-scale irrigation
infrastructure built in the 1960s and ‘70s is reducing water accessibility for
small farmers and domestic water users. Competition between irrigators,
domestic water users, and the energy sector has become intense.
An illustrative dispute was over rights to Laguna Parón, a glacial lake
high in the Cordillera Blanca. In 2008, Cruz de Mayo, a campesino
community, blocked access to the lake to protest water withdrawals for
power generation.95 One protagonist in the Parón conflict was a Duke
Energy subsidiary authorized to manage the Cañon del Pato hydroelectric
plant which supplies power to the region’s cities and industries and to the
national grid.96 Demand for electricity has expanded rapidly in Peru and in
the region, due in no small part to growth in the mining industry.97 To offset
variations in Río Santa flow and meet peak power demand, Duke drew water
from Lake Parón.98 The company claimed the right to control releases partly
on its purported property rights to the lake and partly on the claim that its
technical expertise could prevent disaster.99
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But its releases were incompatible with the irrigation needs of communities
with long-standing rights to lake water, including Cruz de Mayo. Water often
came at the wrong time of day, and its flow, too rapid for irrigation, caused soil
erosion. The small city of Caraz also depended upon the lake for its domestic
water supply, but during dry periods Duke’s releases left insufficient water to
meet urban needs. The blockade lasted eighteen months as officials from
Caraz and surrounding communities petitioned the government for redress.100
After months of negotiation, the national water authority announced that the
lake was part of the Huascarán National Park and “the property of all
Peruvians” and that communities with preexisting rights to lake water would
control releases for agriculture, drinking water, and hydropower on the
condition that Duke be allowed to lower the lake level should it become
dangerously high.101 The agreement fell apart in 2011 when a Constitutional
Court ruled in favor of Duke’s right to the lake.102 Local groups vowed to
continue their protest against Duke’s control of lake levels.103
The Lake Parón conflict was not about scarcity but about access, timing,
and rights claims based on two fundamentally different views of how and by
whom water should be governed. Rights claims legitimated by a faith in
expert management were pitted against “traditional” rights claims grounded
in local knowledge and underlain by a sense of place-based equity. As one
local activist argued, “We must make clear that the water could disappear
and with it the life support for many communities and the town of Caraz.
The right to life and to manage one’s own resources is in play.”104
In its lower reaches, the Río Santa forms the boundary between the
regions of Ancash and La Libertad, and a substantial fraction of the
watershed lies within the latter’s boundaries. Antagonism between the
regions has been marked.105 Regional competition is aggravated by the
presence of two large coastal irrigation and water transfer systems: Chinecas
in the Region of Ancash and CHAVIMOCHIC, Alan García’s pet project in
100
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the Aprista region of La Libertad. These compete for the Santa’s waters.106
Still under construction, CHAVIMOCHIC transfers water into the Chau,
Viru, Mochica, and Chicama valleys for irrigation, power generation, and
urban water supply for the city of Trujillo.107 The project, now in phase three
of development, vastly increases demand for Río Santa water at a time when
supply is likely to become more variable, if not more limited, due to climate
change. CHAVIMOCHIC irrigated area is considerable. In 2006, 86% was
concentrated in the hands of eleven agribusiness enterprises.108 Of these, a
single asparagus producer purchased 33% of all the land reclaimed during
the first two phases of the project.109 Chinecas is an older scheme. It is less
than half the size of its rival and appears to be somewhat less dominated by
huge agroexport enterprises. Chinecas is supposed to supply water for the
city of Chimbote and to irrigated lands in the coastal reaches of the Nepeña
and Casma valleys, but its infrastructure is in poor shape, and water from the
main canal only gets as far as the Nepeña valley. Both water transfer
projects have reduced the supply available to older and smaller coastal
irrigation canals serving local food producers and to Chimbote, Peru’s third
largest city.110 Here one could argue that scarcity is a major driver of water
conflict, but scarcity is politically produced. The likelihood of equitable
allocation not only among the two irrigated areas but also among water users
living and working downstream is reduced by a long tradition of regional
antagonism fueled by national partisan politics.
As these cases indicate, competition in the Santa watershed is still largely
local, but serious upstream-downstream imbalances exist in the irrigation
sector. The upper basin accounts for 40% of the watershed’s irrigated area and
70% of its irrigators, while the coast accounts for some 70% of irrigated area
(about 135,000 ha) and 30% of irrigators.111 This imbalance will become more
marked when the latest phases of the two projects are completed.
106

Id.
M.T. Oré et al., El Agua ante Nuevos Desafíos: Actores e Iniciativas en Ecuador, Peru, y
Bolivia, INSTITUTO DE ESTUDIOS PERUANOS, LIMA (2009); J.S. Kus, Chavimochic: A Peruvian
Irrigation Project, CONGRESS OF LATINAMERICAN GEOGRAPHERS (CLAG), YEARBOOK (1987),
http://sites.maxwell.syr.edu/clag/Yearbook1987/kus.htm.
108
Burneo, supra note 57.
109
Id.
110
According to 2007 census data, the population of Chimbote was 328,987, or 31% of
Ancash’s population. About 30% of Chimbote’s population lacks access to potable water.
See Lynch, supra note 2, at 369.
111
J. Hendriks, Cambio Climático y Gestión de Recursos Hídricos en la Cuenca Ampliada
del RíoSanta, IUCN (June 5, 2008); Burneo, supra note 57.
107

2013]

RIVER OF CONTENTION

91

CHAVIMOCHIC landowners are entitled to a fixed yearly allocation of
10,000 m3/ha.112 In contrast, the water rights of highland irrigators are
defined in terms of access to a canal’s total flow for a fixed time period, so
the latter get less water during droughts. Nonetheless, large coastal
agroenterprises fear that climate change will affect their access to water. In
2008, Peru’s Association of Exporters demanded that the government
guarantee their access to sufficient water to prevent anticipated losses.113 If
met, this request would mean taking water away from highland food
producers and urban residents in order to transform it into virtual water
through the production of agroexports. To date, it does not appear that
highland irrigators have experienced reductions in water supply as a result of
transfers to the special projects, although Bury et al. suggest that this is
imminent.114 A more immediate source of tension is the role that the former
are assigned in water conservation. Highland irrigators have been assigned
the role of watershed protection; they are being asked to plant trees on their
land and to install expensive water saving irrigation technologies. In
response, local irrigation officials and community leaders argue for a quid
pro quo: if coastal enterprises want more water, they need to pay highland
cultivators to adopt conservation measures—whether hi-tech irrigation
systems or reforestation.
In sum, if we look at water competition in the Santa watershed, we find
that it occurs less because water is scarce than because its multiple uses are
incompatible. Water demand for power generation and agroexports has been
growing as a result of the government policies of the past twenty-five years,
while policies that have favored growth of mining have rendered water unfit
for irrigation or human and animal consumption. There is an intimate
relationship between agroexport growth and scarcity discourse because the
latter has been used to justify construction of the water transfer apparatus
that has allowed this growth to occur. In addition, because they use
sophisticated irrigation technologies, agribusinesses are portrayed as modern
and water conserving even though they are responsible for the export of
virtual water that could be used to enhance food security. Yet, it is likely
112
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that as water supply becomes erratic due to deglaciation, scarcity will be
experienced most severely by those water users lacking secure water rights.
V. CONCLUSION
While water stress is prevalent in the Santa watershed, conflict is not
about scarcity but about competition resulting from jurisdictional conflict,
the incompatibility of different sectoral uses of water, and access to water,
which is inequitable and uneven at best. In addition, water stress is being
produced by mine pollution that makes the river’s water unfit for irrigation
or livestock and human consumption, and in the future, it may be
manufactured by water transfers to the lands of agroexport investors.
Alternatives to scarcity-creating water regimes are present in some Andean
communities where water rights are tied to community membership, place,
water supply, the agricultural cycle and labor contributions to system operation
and maintenance. These regimes are, at least normatively, responsive to
vulnerabilities produced by drought because they entail obligations to the
water resource, and in times of scarcity a moral economy of subsistence may
come into play. At the river basin level, water regimes based on
complementarity encourage conservation and improve water quality.
Lastly, we need to turn our attention to political issues of representation
and exclusion. While there is support for water user consultation on paper,
Peruvian institutions have much to do to make inclusion of the most
vulnerable water users in decision-making roles a reality. Policies that
recognize the relationship between water and land and the importance of
water in sustaining local ecosystems, programs that encourage
complementarity, and inclusive institutions may in the end contribute more
to sustainability and conservation than those based on a fear of scarcity.

